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  OPINION 
________________                              
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
 This is the latest action in a long series of disputes 
that followed the attempted condemnation of commercial 
property in Conshohocken, Pennsylvania.  Seeking to 
revitalize the Conshohocken waterfront, the 
Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County (the 
“Authority”) – at the behest of developer Donald Pulver 
– attempted to condemn Plaintiffs’ property, which was 
home to a successful steel processing business.  The 
Plaintiffs fought the condemnation in state court.  
Plaintiffs prevailed, and were awarded their attorneys’ 
fees and expenses. 
But because the Authority held title to Plaintiffs’ 
property throughout the state court action, Plaintiffs filed 
a claim in federal court, seeking the “just compensation” 
promised by the Fifth Amendment.  The District Court 
rejected Plaintiffs’ claim, essentially because they had 
never asked the Redevelopment Authority whether it 
would simply give them “just compensation.”  Turning 
again to the state courts, Plaintiffs did so, and were 
rebuffed because the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain 
Code does not provide for “just compensation” in these 
situations.  Thus denied, Plaintiffs returned to federal 
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court, still seeking their “just compensation.”  The 
District Court dismissed their case, holding that Plaintiffs 
should have brought their federal claims as part of their 
second action in state court. 
We will reverse. 
I 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) over Plaintiffs’ federal 
claims under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and 
42 U.S.C. § 1983.  The District Court had supplemental 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) over 
Plaintiffs’ state claims forming part of the same case or 
controversy.  The District Court’s December 2, 2009 
Order was a final decision disposing of all of Plaintiffs’ 
claims.  Plaintiffs timely filed their Notice of Appeal on 
December 28, 2009.  We have appellate jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
 We exercise plenary review over a District Court 
order dismissing a complaint.  See Pension Benefit Guar. 
Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1197 
(3d Cir. 1993).  On a motion to dismiss, “we must 
‘accept all factual allegations as true, construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and 
determine, whether under any reasonable reading of the 
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.’”  
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Gelman v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 583 F.3d 187, 
190 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Phillips v. Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008)). 
II 
At all times relevant to this lawsuit, Plaintiff R&J 
Holding Company (the “owner”) owned the parcel of 
land located at 110 Washington Street, Conshohocken, 
Pennsylvania.  Plaintiff RJ Florig Industrial Company 
was R&J Holding’s lessee and operated a steel 
processing business on the land.  The Defendant 
Redevelopment Authority of Montgomery County is a 
government agency with the power of eminent domain.  
Defendant Donald Pulver, a land developer, is the 
principal of Defendants Greater Conshohocken 
Improvement Corporation and TBFA Partners, L.P.  For 
ease of reference, we will refer to the three as “the Pulver 
Defendants.”   
 In 1986, the Authority and the Pulver Defendants 
conceived a plan to redevelop certain land, including the 
subject property, situated in Montgomery County, 
Pennsylvania.  They entered into a series of agreements, 
under which the Authority was to condemn as blighted 
the Plaintiffs’ real property and convey it to the Pulver 
Defendants.  Importantly, the agreements provided that 
the Authority could initiate condemnation proceedings 
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against the property only when directed to do so by 
Pulver. 
 On July 11, 1996, at Pulver’s direction, the 
Authority filed a Declaration of Taking for the subject 
property.  This had the effect of transferring title to the 
property to the Authority.  See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 
1-402(a) (1997).1
 The Commonwealth Court reversed in an opinion 
dated February 13, 2001.    It agreed with the owner that 
the Authority had given the Pulver Defendants the power 
to determine whether and when to condemn the subject 
property.  It held that such a delegation of eminent 
domain power was unlawful, as eminent domain is 
  The owner opposed the taking, arguing 
that it was unlawful because – by giving the Pulver 
Defendants the power to determine whether and when to 
initiate condemnation proceedings – the Authority had 
improperly delegated its eminent domain powers.  The 
Common Pleas Court approved the taking over the 
owner’s objection, and the owner appealed this ruling to 
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court.   
                                                 
1 Section 1-402 is part of Pennsylvania’s Eminent 
Domain Code, 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-401 et seq.  
The Code was repealed and replaced in 2006, but the 
provisions of the pre-2006 Code are at issue in this case.  
See In re De Facto Condemnation and Taking of Lands, 
972 A.2d 576, 580 n.2 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2009).  
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inherently a sovereign power and cannot be exercised by 
a private party.  The court therefore invalidated the 
taking and remanded the case to the Court of Common 
Pleas.  In re Condemnation of 110 Washington Street, 
767 A.2d 1154, 1160-61 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2001). 
 On remand, the owner petitioned for fees and 
expenses under §§ 1-406 and 1-408 of the Eminent 
Domain Code.  These sections provide that an owner 
who successfully resists a condemnation action (i.e., a 
prevailing condemnee) is entitled to “reasonable 
appraisal, attorney and engineering fees and other costs 
and expenses actually incurred because of the 
condemnation proceeding.”  Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-408 
(1997).  The court awarded the owner $550,959.73.  See 
R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Cnty. of 
Montgomery, 885 A.2d 643, 647 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005). 
 In late 2002, Plaintiffs filed a § 1983 suit in federal 
court against the Authority and the Pulver Defendants.  
Their complaint asserted (among other claims) a Fifth 
Amendment takings claim seeking just compensation.  
Plaintiffs alleged – as they do here – that they were 
deprived of certain fundamental property rights, 
including the right to improve the property and the right 
to sell the property.   
 The Defendants moved to dismiss on ripeness 
grounds.  Under Williamson County Regional Planning 
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Commission v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172 (1985), if a 
state provides an adequate procedure for seeking just 
compensation, a Fifth Amendment takings claim is not 
ripe until the owner has availed itself of the procedure 
and been denied just compensation.  See id. at 194.  This 
is because the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit the 
taking of property; it only prohibits the taking of property 
without just compensation.  See id. at 194 & n.13; Cnty. 
Concrete Corp. v. Town of Roxbury, 442 F.3d 159, 164 
(3d Cir. 2006) (noting that under Williamson County, a 
takings claim is not ripe until “the plaintiff has 
unsuccessfully exhausted the state’s procedures for 
seeking ‘just compensation,’ so long as the procedures 
provided by the state were adequate”).    
The District Court determined that Pennsylvania’s 
Eminent Domain Code allows an aggrieved property 
owner to seek just compensation in these circumstances 
by filing an inverse-condemnation action.  See R&J 
Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of the Cnty. of 
Montgomery, No. 02-cv-9530, 2003 WL 22387034, at 
*4-6 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2003).  Because the owner had 
not yet filed an inverse-condemnation action seeking just 
compensation, the District Court dismissed the takings 
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claim on ripeness grounds.  Id. (citing Williamson 
County, 473 U.S. at 194-95).2
Plaintiffs then filed an inverse-condemnation 
action in the Montgomery County Court of Common 
Pleas.  Asserting that they had suffered a taking during 
the unlawful condemnation proceeding, Plaintiffs argued 
that they were entitled to compensation under 
Pennsylvania’s Eminent Domain Code.  At the same 
time, Plaintiffs invoked England v. Louisiana State 
Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411 (1964), to 
reserve their federal claims for federal court.  The Court 
of Common Pleas agreed with the Plaintiffs and ordered 
the parties to appear before a board of viewers to 
determine the amount of damages.  The Authority 
appealed.   
    
   The Commonwealth Court reversed.  It held that 
the Eminent Domain Code does not entitle a prevailing 
condemnee to compensatory damages.  Rather, the Code 
                                                 
2 The owner had also asserted a substantive due process 
claim for improper delegation of authority.  The District 
Court dismissed that claim on statute-of-limitations 
grounds.  The owner appealed the dismissal of that claim 
(but not the dismissal of its takings claim), and we 
affirmed in a non-precedential opinion.  See R&J 
Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of Cnty. of 
Montgomery, 165 F. App’x 175 (3d Cir. 2006).   
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limits a prevailing condemnee’s recovery to the out-of-
pocket expenses available under §§ 1-406 and 1-408.  
Because the owner had already recovered expenses under 
§§ 1-406 and 1-408, the court concluded that the 
Plaintiffs had received all the relief to which they were 
entitled under the Code.  See R&J Holding Co. v. 
Redevelopment Auth. of the Cnty. of Montgomery, 885 
A.2d 643, 649-50 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005).  Plaintiffs’ 
brief before the Commonwealth Court repeatedly 
invoked their rights under the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
but never directly mentioned their rights under the United 
States Constitution.  The Commonwealth Court’s opinion 
never explicitly addressed whether denying just 
compensation violated the state or federal constitutions.   
The owner asked the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
to review the Commonwealth Court’s decision, but it 
declined to do so.3
Having been denied relief, Plaintiffs returned to 
federal court and filed the current action.  They asserted 
essentially the same Fifth Amendment takings claim that 
they had asserted in the first federal lawsuit, as well as 
assorted claims under state law.  Defendants moved to 
 
                                                 
3 Plaintiffs renewed their purported reservation of federal 
claims in their briefing before the Commonwealth Court 
and in their Petition for Allowance of Appeal to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court. 
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dismiss, arguing (among other things) that the takings 
claim was barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion.  
The District Court agreed, dismissed the claim, and 
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
state-law claims.  See R&J Holding Co. v. 
Redevelopment Auth. of Montgomery Cnty., No. 06-1671, 
2009 WL 4362567 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 30, 2009).            
This appeal followed.   
III 
 While the District Court addressed only 
Defendants’ arguments regarding claim preclusion, 
Defendants assert numerous grounds for affirming the 
District Court, including claim preclusion, issue 
preclusion, failure to state a claim, and the statute of 
limitations.  We address each in turn. 
III.A 
Under the Full Faith and Credit Statute, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738, “judicial proceedings . . . shall have the same full 
faith and credit in every court within the United States . . 
. as they have by law or usage in the courts of” the state 
from which they emerged.  Section 1738 “has long been 
understood to encompass the doctrines of res judicata, or 
‘claim preclusion,’ and collateral estoppel, or ‘issue 
preclusion.’”  San Remo Hotel v. City & Cnty. of S.F., 
545 U.S. 323, 336 (2005).  To determine the effect of a 
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Pennsylvania court judgment, we are required to apply 
Pennsylvania’s claim- and issue-preclusion law.  See 
Kremer v. Chem. Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 466 (1982) 
(“Section 1738 requires federal courts to give the same 
preclusive effect to state court judgments that those 
judgments would be given in the courts of the State from 
which the judgments emerged.”). 
 Claim preclusion, or res judicata, is a defense 
asserted when a case is essentially identical to one that 
has previously been adjudicated.  In many jurisdictions, 
claim preclusion extends not only to those claims 
actually asserted in a previous action, but also to all those 
claims which could have been asserted.  Pennsylvania’s 
law of claim preclusion was summarized by the state 
supreme court in Balent v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 669 
A.2d 309, 313 (Pa. 1995):  “Any final, valid judgment on 
the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction precludes 
any future suit between the parties or their privies on the 
same cause of action.  Res judicata applies not only to 
claims actually litigated, but also to claims which could 
have been litigated during the first proceeding if they 
were part of the same cause of action.”  For claim 
preclusion to apply, Pennsylvania requires that the two 
actions share the following four conditions:  (1) the thing 
sued upon or for; (2) the cause of action; (3) the persons 
and parties to the action; and (4) the capacity of the 
parties to sue or be sued.  See Bearoff v. Bearoff Bros., 
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Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 74 (Pa. 1974).  But we need not 
consider whether all of these elements are present.  
Because the Plaintiffs clearly stated their intention to 
split their state and federal claims during the second state 
action and the Defendants raised no objections, the 
Defendants have acquiesced to the Plaintiffs’ claim 
splitting.4
                                                 
4 The Dissent argues that the Plaintiffs had already 
waived their federal rights when they failed to assert 
them as preliminary objections in the first state action.  
The Dissent is correct that failure to raise certain matters 
as a preliminary objection constitutes a waiver, but those 
matters are specifically enumerated by statute:  
“Preliminary objections shall be limited to and shall be 
the exclusive method of challenging (1) the power or 
right of the condemnor to appropriate the condemned 
property unless the same has been previously 
adjudicated; (2) the sufficiency of the security; (3) any 
other procedure followed by the condemnor; or (4) the 
declaration of taking.  Failure to raise these matters by 
preliminary objections shall constitute a waiver thereof.”  
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-406 (1997) (emphasis added).  
In this action, Plaintiffs do not challenge the validity of 
the taking, the security supplied, or the procedure used.  
Rather, Plaintiffs challenge the sufficiency of their 
compensation.  This is not an issue that must be raised by 
preliminary objections, so it cannot have been waived. 
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 As we held in Bradley v. Pittsburgh Board of 
Education, 913 F.2d 1064 (3d Cir. 1990), Pennsylvania 
follows Section 26(1) of the Restatement (Second) of 
Judgments, which provides that claim preclusion shall 
not apply where: 
 (a) The parties have agreed in terms 
or in effect that the plaintiff may split his 
claim or the defendant has acquiesced 
therein; or 
 (b) The court in the first action has 
expressly reserved the plaintiff’s right to 
maintain the second action. 
Id. at 1072 (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 26(1)).  We also held in Bradley, pursuant to the 
commentary in the Restatement, that “[t]he failure of the 
defendant to object to the splitting of the plaintiff’s claim 
is effective as an acquiescence in the splitting of the 
claim.”  Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 26(1)(a) cmt. a (1982)).  We further noted that the 
Restatement explicitly mentioned cases where “the 
opposing party may acquiesce in the federal claim being 
split off and reserved.”  Id. at 1073 (quoting Restatement 
(Second) of Judgments § 86, cmt. f). 
In Coleman v. Coleman, 522 A.2d 1115, 1120 (Pa. 
Super. 1987) (en banc), the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
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quoting Restatement Sections 26(1) (a) and (b), held that 
“[t]he law of Pennsylvania is in accord with the approach 
taken by the Restatement.”  Id.  In a prior case, the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court explained:  “Though such 
splitting of actions is not favored it is not impermissible 
when the parties and the court agree on that method of 
adjudicating the action.”  Keystone Bldg. Corp. v. 
Lincoln S&L Ass’n, 360 A.2d 191, 196 n.10 (Pa. 1976). 
   Neither the briefs of the parties nor our own 
research has uncovered any Pennsylvania case which 
would call Bradley’s interpretation of Pennsylvania law 
into question.  As such, Bradley controls the outcome 
here.  On the very first page of their state complaint, 
Plaintiffs noted their intent to reserve their federal claims 
for adjudication in a federal forum.  Plaintiffs reiterated 
their intent to reserve their federal claims in their filings 
before the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Defendants uttered not a 
word about the reserved federal claims while Plaintiffs 
prosecuted their state claims all the way to the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  They cannot now benefit 
from their silence.5
                                                 
5 The Pulver Defendants argue that such consent cannot 
bind them because they were not parties to the first 
action.  But the defense of claim preclusion can be 
asserted only by parties that did participate in the first 
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Note that our decision relies solely on our 
interpretation of Pennsylvania claim preclusion law.  
Plaintiffs originally styled their reservation of federal 
claims as an England reservation.  In England v. 
Louisiana State Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 
411 (1964), the Supreme Court held that “when a federal 
court abstains from deciding a federal constitutional issue 
to enable the state courts to address an antecedent state-
law issue, the plaintiff may reserve his right to return to 
federal court for the disposition of his federal claims.”  
San Remo, 545 U.S. at 339 (discussing England).  
England was decided in the context of Pullman 
abstention, under which a federal court postpones 
exercise of its properly-invoked jurisdiction and directs 
the parties to state court because the outcome may be 
decided by an antecedent question of state law.  See R.R. 
                                                                                                             
action.  See Balent, 669 A.2d at 313 (“Any final, valid 
judgment on the merits by a court of competent 
jurisdiction precludes any future suit between the parties 
or their privies on the same cause of action.” (emphasis 
added)).  To the extent the Pulver Defendants are 
asserting that they are in privity with the Authority and 
therefore participated in the first action, they cannot have 
it both ways.  Either they are in privity and are bound by 
the Authority’s implied consent, or they are not in privity 
and lack standing to assert the defense of claim 
preclusion. 
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Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). 
England reservations have been permitted outside 
the Pullman context, including in cases sent to state court 
to fulfill the ripeness requirements of Williamson County.  
See, e.g., Fields v. Sarasota Manatee Airport Auth., 953 
F.2d 1299, 1306 (11th Cir. 1992).  But the availability of 
an England reservation in the Williamson County context 
has been called into question by San Remo Hotel v. City 
& County of San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005), in 
which the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could not 
rely on England to avoid the bar of issue preclusion in a 
takings case.  See id. at 338.  Yet we need not consider 
the continued viability of England in the Williamson 
context.  Regardless of whether Plaintiffs’ statement was 
valid as an England reservation, it provided notice to 
Defendants of Plaintiffs’ intent to split their state and 
federal claims.  And Plaintiffs reiterated their intent to 
reserve their federal claims in filings before the 
Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court and the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court.  Defendants’ failure to 
object constitutes implied consent under Pennsylvania 
law.  Thus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1738, we faithfully 
apply Pennsylvania law in concluding that Plaintiffs’ 
claims are permitted.6
                                                 
6 Defendants suggest that San Remo undermines our 
holding in Bradley.  But Bradley contained two entirely 
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III.B 
 Defendants have raised several alternative bases 
for affirming the District Court’s judgment, namely issue 
preclusion, failure to state a claim, and the statute of 
limitations.  “We ordinarily decline to consider issues not 
decided by a district court, choosing instead to allow that 
court to consider them in the first instance.”  Forestal 
Guarini SA v. Daros Int’l, Inc., 613 F.3d 395, 401 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  But given the vintage of this dispute, we 
think it appropriate, as a matter of judicial economy, to 
accelerate its resolution to the extent reasonably possible.  
These three issues are properly before us and have been 
fully briefed.  We exercise our discretion to resolve them 
now.7
                                                                                                             
independent holdings:  first, that an England reservation 
was available under the circumstances of that case, 913 
F.2d at 1072; second, that the defendants had – as a 
matter of Pennsylvania state law – impliedly consented to 
Bradley splitting his state and federal claims, id. at 1072-
73.  Even if we assume (without deciding) that Bradley’s 
first holding is no longer good law, there is no reason to 
conclude that Bradley’s second holding was undermined 
in any way by San Remo. 
 
 
7 Defendants also object to plaintiffs’ request for punitive 
damages and plaintiffs’ suit against Mr. Pulver in his 
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 Just as claim preclusion bars re-litigation of an 
entire case, issue preclusion bars re-litigation of discrete 
issues, even in a case based on an entirely different 
claim.  The fundamental question is whether the issue has 
been actually decided by a court in a prior action.  See 
McNeil v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 680 A.2d 
1145, 1147-48 (Pa. 1996) (“[W]hen an issue of fact or of 
law is actually litigated and determined by a valid final 
judgment, and determination of the issue was essential to 
judgment, the determination on that issue is conclusive in 
a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the 
same or a different claim.”). 
 The parties agree that the Plaintiffs avoided 
directly raising their federal claims before the 
Pennsylvania state courts.  And in its opinion holding 
that the Eminent Domain Code did not provide for “just 
compensation” under the circumstances of this case, R&J 
Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of the Cnty. of 
Montgomery, 885 A.2d 643, 650 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2005), 
the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court never directly 
addressed whether such an interpretation was permitted 
under the United States Constitution. 
 Nonetheless, the Defendants assert that issue 
preclusion should apply.  Defendants’ argument runs as 
                                                                                                             
individual capacity.  We leave these and any remaining 
issues for initial consideration by the District Court. 
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follows:  The Plaintiffs did argue that an interpretation of 
the Eminent Domain Code denying just compensation 
could conflict with the Pennsylvania Constitution.  Since 
the Commonwealth Court had the constitutional 
argument before it, the court must necessarily have 
decided that its interpretation of the Eminent Domain 
Code was permissible under the Pennsylvania 
Constitution (even though the court never actually said 
so).  See Grubb v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Ohio, 281 U.S. 
470, 477-78 (1930) (“The question of the constitutional 
validity of the order was distinctly presented by the 
appellant’s petition and necessarily was resolved against 
him by the judgment affirming the order.  Omitting to 
mention that question in the opinion did not eliminate it 
from the case or make the judgment . . . any less an 
adjudication of it.”); Balent, 669 A.2d at 315 (Pa. 1995) 
(“[W]e must assume that the court properly considered 
the constitutional implications, before making its final 
determination that the taking was non-compensable.”).  
Finally, the Pennsylvania and United States constitutions 
have been interpreted co-extensively by Pennsylvania 
courts.  See United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of 
Phila., 635 A.2d 612, 616 (Pa. 1993) (“[T]his Court has 
continually turned to federal precedent for guidance in its 
‘taking’ jurisprudence, and indeed has adopted the 
analysis used by the federal courts.”).  Therefore, by 
determining the state constitutional issue, the 
Commonwealth Court determined the federal 
 22 
 
constitutional issue. 
 We disagree.  First, even assuming the 
Commonwealth Court’s opinion inherently considered 
the federal constitutionality of its interpretation of the 
Eminent Domain Code, that has no bearing on whether 
there are alternative means for obtaining just 
compensation (such as a § 1983 suit).  Second, this chain 
of logic stretches too far.  The parties never actually 
litigated the federal constitutionality of the Pennsylvania 
Eminent Domain Code and the state courts never actually 
decided it.  A past conclusion that the Takings Clause of 
the Pennsylvania Constitution and the Takings Clause of 
the United States Constitution are co-extensive does not 
constitute a present determination that an interpretation 
of state law accords with the United States Constitution, 
particularly when the federal constitutionality of that 
interpretation was never directly presented to the state 
court. 
 We hold that issue preclusion does not bar 
Plaintiffs’ suit. 
III.C 
Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs have failed to 
state a claim because this is not a taking.  TBFA argues 
that without an accompanying attempt to take physical 
possession of the property, transfer of title to the 
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government does not constitute a taking.  TBFA also 
argues that the Plaintiffs have abandoned any argument 
based on regulatory takings precedent.  The Authority, 
Pulver, and GCIC argue that even if regulatory takings 
precedent is applied, this is not a taking.  We conclude 
that this is a per se taking because title to the land 
actually passed from Plaintiffs to the Authority when the 
Authority filed a Declaration of Taking on July 11, 1996. 
In Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992), the 
Supreme Court explained that “[w]here the government 
authorizes a physical occupation of property (or actually 
takes title), the Takings Clause generally requires 
compensation.”  Id. at 522 (emphasis added).  In United 
States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903), as a first step 
towards determining whether there had been a taking, the 
Court noted:  “Was there a taking?  There was no 
proceeding in condemnation instituted by the 
government, no attempt in terms to take and appropriate 
the title.”  Id. at 468.  This implies that had such an 
attempt occurred, the Court would have held there to be a 
taking. 
Defendants dismiss Yee as a regulatory takings 
case.  But while Yee was indeed a regulatory takings 
case, the Supreme Court had to formulate some way to 
decide whether it was a regulatory takings case.  In both 
Yee and Lynah, the first question asked was “Did the 
government take title or possession of the land?”  While 
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the Court answered in the negative in both cases, 
answering in the affirmative would have obviated any 
need for considering regulatory takings jurisprudence. 
In addition, the nature of the Authority’s action 
belies any argument that this was a regulatory taking.  
Had the Authority been successful in state court, it 
intended to take physical possession of the property.  The 
lines of precedent for per se and regulatory takings are 
separate and distinct.  See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation 
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency,  535 
U.S. 302, 323-24 (2002) (holding it “inappropriate to 
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling 
precedents for the evaluation of a claim that there has 
been a ‘regulatory taking,’ and vice versa”).  Because the 
Authority’s acquisition of the property would have ended 
as a per se taking, it must have begun as a per se taking.8
                                                 
8 Supreme Court precedent does suggest that in some rare 
cases, regulatory takings may be considered the 
equivalent of per se takings.  The Court has identified 
only two situations in which this would occur:  first, 
where regulation compels physical invasion of an 
owner’s property; second, where regulation deprives an 
owner of all economically beneficial use of their 
property.   See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 
1003, 1015-18 (1992).  Neither situation is at issue here. 
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The only contrary authority cited by the 
Defendants is Horne v. USDA, No. CV-F-08-1549, 2009 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115464 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2009).  In 
that case, the District Court considered the 
constitutionality of a raisin marketing order under which 
a certain portion of the raisin crop was required to be 
transferred to the Raisin Administrative Committee as 
“reserve tonnage.”  The District Court concluded that 
“the transfer of title to the reserve tonnage does not 
constitute a physical taking.”  Id. at *76.  The Ninth 
Circuit, though affirming the judgment of the District 
Court, rested its analysis on a sounder analytical 
framework, concluding that “the Raisin Marketing Order 
applies to the Hornes only insofar as they voluntarily 
choose to send their raisins into the stream of interstate 
commerce.”  Horne v. USDA, No. 10-15270, 2011 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 15284, at *23 (July 25, 2011).  In other 
words, in order to participate in the world of raisin 
marketing, growers must surrender a portion of their crop 
as an entrance fee.  But whether growers choose to sell in 
interstate commerce (and pay the fee) is entirely their 
prerogative.  To the extent the District Court in Horne 
was stating a broader position, we cannot agree. 
Yee and Lynah seem to indicate that a per se taking 
can be triggered by either:  (1)  a physical occupation of 
the owner’s land or (2) a transfer of title.  We agree.  
Practice involving federal government takings confirms 
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that transfer of title is a watershed moment.  When the 
federal government is involved in condemnation 
proceedings, it can file a Declaration of Taking and pay 
estimated just compensation.  If it does so, title passes 
immediately, and this set of events marks the “taking.”  
See United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 22-23 (1958) 
(noting that the filing of a declaration and payment of 
just compensation works a transfer of title and that “[t]he 
scheme of the Taking Act makes it plain that when the 
Government files a declaration before it has entered into 
possession of the property the filing constitutes the 
‘taking’”).  In addition, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
71A(i)(1) prohibits judges from dismissing a 
condemnation proceeding “if the plaintiff has already 
taken title, a lesser interest, or possession as to any part 
of” the property.  Rather, the court “must award 
compensation for the  title, lesser interest, or possession 
taken.”  Id.  Again, this implies that transfer of title 
constitutes a taking, for which just compensation must be 
paid. 
The parties do not dispute that transfer of title 
occurred by operation of Pennsylvania’s Eminent 
Domain Code.  See 26 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 1-402(a) 
(1997) (repealed 2006) (“[T]he title which the 
condemnor acquires in the property condemned [passes] 
to the condemnor on the date of [the filing in court of the 
declaration of taking.]”).  As the Supreme Court has 
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explained, its “jurisprudence involving condemnations 
and physical takings is as old as the Republic and, for the 
most part, involves the straightforward application of per 
se rules.”  Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322.  Because title 
was actually transferred to the Authority, we hold that 
this was a per se taking. 
III.D 
 
Finally, the Defendants assert that the Plaintiffs’ 
claims are barred by the statute of limitations.  We 
disagree. 
 Defendants appear to be arguing that the takings 
claims at issue here can be equated with improper 
delegation claims that were dismissed on statute of 
limitations grounds by the District Court in the first 
federal action.  See R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment 
Auth. of the Cnty. of Montgomery, No. 02-cv-09530, 
2003 WL 22387034, at *6-*9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 15, 2003), 
aff’d, 165 F. App’x 175 (3d Cir. 2006) (not precedential).  
They cannot.  Plaintiffs’ claims here are clearly distinct. 
Defendants also cite several pieces of literature 
arguing that the Williamson County “ripeness” label is 
incorrect and misleading or that plaintiffs should 
generally only be able to proceed in state court on takings 
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claims.9
 As we held in Whittle v. Local 641, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, 56 F.3d 487, 489 (3d Cir. 
  These arguments are unpersuasive in light of the 
Supreme Court’s repeated description of Williamson 
County’s requirements as a ripeness issue.  See, e.g., 
Williamson County, 473 U.S. at 186 (“Because 
respondent has not yet obtained a final decision regarding 
the application of the zoning ordinance and subdivision 
regulations to its property, nor utilized the procedures 
Tennessee provides for obtaining just compensation, 
respondent’s claim is not ripe.”).  These arguments also 
ignore the fundamental basis of the Williamson opinion:  
simply put, until just compensation has been denied, an 
owner has not suffered a constitutional injury and does 
not have a federal takings claim.  See id. at 194 n.13 
(“[B]ecause the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings 
without just compensation, no constitutional violation 
occurs until just compensation has been denied.”). 
                                                 
9 See Thomas E. Roberts, Fifth Amendment Taking 
Claims in Federal Court:  The State Compensation 
Requirement and Principles of Res Judicata, 24 Urb. 
Law, 479, 501-03 (1992); Thomas E. Roberts, Facial 
Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow:  A Procedural 
Loose End, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev., 623, 634-35 (2002); 
Douglas T. Kendell et al., Choice of Forum and Finality 
Ripeness:  The Unappreciated Hot Topics in Regulatory 
Takings Cases, 33 Urb. Law 405, 407-09 (2001). 
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2005):  “[A] cause accrues when it is sufficiently ripe 
that one can maintain suit on it.”  Plaintiffs’ takings claim 
did not accrue until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court 
denied review in the second state action on March 21, 
2006.  See R&J Holding Co. v. Redevelopment Auth. of 
the Cnty. of Montgomery, Nos. 1018 &1019  MAL 2005 
(Pa. Mar. 21, 2006).  Because this action was filed on 
April 21, 2006, it is of no moment whether we adopt the 
statute of limitations put forward by the Plaintiffs 
(twenty-one years) or the statute of limitations put 
forward by the Defendants (two years).  The action is 
timely. 
III.D 
In light of its dismissal of the federal claims, the 
District Court properly declined to exercise jurisdiction 
over Plaintiffs’ state law claims.  But “[s]ince we will 
reinstate [Plaintiffs’ federal claims], we must vacate that 
portion of the district court’s order dismissing without 
prejudice [Plaintiffs’] pendent state law claims 
. . . .  The standard for exercising discretion to dismiss 
state claims pendent on a viable federal claim differs 
from the standard governing dismissal when the federal 
claim itself lacks merit.”  Markowitz v. Ne. Land Co., 906 
F.2d 100, 106 (3d Cir. 1990). 
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IV 
 We conclude that Plaintiffs’ suit cannot be barred 
on the grounds of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, 
failure to state a claim, or the statute of limitations.   
This is the latest in a long series of actions 
following the condemnation of a single piece of property.  
We are aware that the parties and the courts have 
expended substantial resources over the years in efforts 
to resolve the underlying dispute.  But the Plaintiffs – 
having reserved their federal rights in state court and 
having received no objection from the Defendants – are 
entitled to a federal forum for their federal claims. 
We will reverse and remand to the District Court 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.10
                                                 
10 Citing United States v. Bodcaw, 440 U.S. 202 (1979), 
the Dissent asserts that a remand would be futile because 
the damages sought by the Plaintiffs exceed the scope of 
damages available to them under the Fifth Amendment.  
We disagree.  Just compensation is limited to damages 
sought “for the property,” id. at 203, and thus Bodcaw 
excluded appraisal fees incurred in a condemnation 
action from the scope of just compensation, see id. at 
204.  Such indirect costs are not the result of an 
impairment of property rights.  But here Plaintiffs seek 
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compensation for their inability to fully utilize, develop, 
and sell their property.  There can be no question that 
these are rights inhering in the property itself, unlike the 
indirect costs excluded by Bodcaw.  To the extent some 
of Plaintiffs’ claims seek both direct and indirect costs, 
we leave it to the District Court to consider the scope of 
those claims and, if appropriate, to limit them. 
1 
 
R&J Holding Company, RJ Florig Industrial Company, Inc. 
v. The Redevelopment Authority of the County of 
Montgomery, No. 10-1047.   
 
Nygaard, J.  Dissenting.  
 In its singular focus upon R.J. Florig’s procedural 
machinations, I believe the majority has erred.  Three 
conclusions compel my dissent:  1.) R.J. Florig’s federal 
claims have been waived; 2.) the issues raised in the federal 
claims have been conclusively addressed by the state court; 
and 3.) the lack of a federal remedy moots the federal claims.  
  
 The Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code “is intended 
. . . to provide a complete and exclusive procedure and law to 
govern all condemnations of property for public purposes and 
the assessment of damages therefor. . . .”  26 P.S. § 1-303 
(1996).  In that vein, the Code states that “[a]ll preliminary 
objections shall be raised at one time and in one pleading.”  
26 P.S. § 1-406(c) (1996).  Moreover, “[f]ailure to raise these 
matters by preliminary objections shall constitute a waiver 
thereof.”  26 P.S. § 1-406(a) (1996).   The Commonwealth 
Court said that “preliminary objections are intended as a 
procedure to resolve expeditiously the factual and legal 
challenges to a declaration of taking before the parties 
proceed to determine damages.”  In re Condemnation by City 
of Coatesville, 898 A.2d 1186, 1189 n. 7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2006).  
The problem, however, is that R.J. Florig never raised its 
federal claims.  Rather, it stated in a footnote to its 
preliminary objections: 
 
R.J. Florig Company is not 
presenting in this case its federal 
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constitutional and civil rights 
claims, including the claims that 
the actions of the Authority and 
others constitute a taking of 
private property for purported 
public use without just 
compensation and a deprivation of 
property without due process of 
law in violation of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments of the 
Unites States Constitution.  R.J. 
Florig Company reserves its right 
to litigate these federal claims in 
federal court.   
     
Preliminary Objections, p. 2 n. 1.  While R.J. Florig declared 
that it was “not presenting” its claims, the Code does not 
authorize parties to make such a choice.  They are limited by 
the law.  See § 1-406(c).  By the terms of the Code, R.J. 
Florig’s failure to raise these claims in its preliminary 
objections must be regarded as a waiver of those claims.  
Accordingly, R.J. Florig’s abandoned federal claims should 
not have been considered by the District Court.   
 
 Moreover, as the District Court determined, the issues 
raised in R.J. Florig’s federal complaint have been 
conclusively ruled upon in state court.  We already 
affirmed—in an earlier decision—the District Court’s denial 
of R.J. Florig’s section 1983 claim as time-barred.  In its 
federal complaint, R.J. Florig premises its remaining federal 
takings claim by characterizing the Commonwealth Court’s 
holding in its inverse condemnation action as follows: 
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Plaintiffs pursued just 
compensation for taking of their 
property rights in state court 
under Pennsylvania law but 
Pennsylvania appellate courts 
conclusively determined that 
Pennsylvania does not provide a 
remedy
 
 for taking of Plaintiffs’ 
property rights during the 
unlawful de jure condemnation of 
their property, regardless of the 
extent of the taking.   
Complaint, ¶ 107 (emphasis added).  This statement 
misconstrues the Commonwealth Court’s ruling.  The 
Commonwealth Court determined the following:  
 
In this case, R & J Holding 
already received costs and 
expenses under Section 408 of the 
Eminent Domain Code.  Thus, 
they are not entitled to any more 
costs and expenses under any 
other Section of the Eminent 
Domain Code because the Code 
does not require that a condemnee 
be made whole.  Moreover, R & J 
Holding is seeking damages under 
502(e) which only applies when 
“no declaration of taking therefor 
has been filed”.  To apply this 
Section to this case, this Court 
would have to insert the word 
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“valid” before “declaration of 
taking.”  Because a declaration of 
taking was filed in this case, 
damages under Section 502(e) are 
not available to R & J Holding.   
 
R & J Holding Company v. The Redevelopment Authority of 
the County of Montgomery, 885 A.2d 643, 650 (Pa. Cmwlth. 
2005) (internal citations omitted).  The Commonwealth Court 
ruled that, because this case originated in a declaration of 
taking, it is a de jure condemnation.  R.J. Florig’s successful 
defense against the declaration under the Code’s de jure 
provisions enabled it to regain title to its property and receive 
attorney’s fees and costs in the amount of $550,959.73.  The 
Commonwealth Court determined that, having received these 
remedies, R.J. Florig was not permitted to simply re-label the 
very same taking as an inverse de facto condemnation and go 
back to court seeking another remedy.   
 
 Therefore, the Commonwealth Court did not rule that 
R.J. Florig was without a remedy.  To the contrary, it ruled 
that the 1996 taking of R.J. Florig’s property was 
conclusively litigated and fully remedied in accordance with 
the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code, and as a result it 
could not be re-litigated.  R.J. Florig wishes to read the 
decision as pointing to a gap in the scheme of just 
compensation permitted under the Code when, in fact, the 
decision closed the door to them.  Its federal Fifth 
Amendment taking claim is, in every respect, the de facto 
condemnation claim raised and dismissed in state court.  Res 
judicata requires that we respect the state court’s ruling by 
affirming the District Court’s dismissal of the claim.  
Therefore, even were we to assume that the federal claims 
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were properly severed from the state claim, res judicata 
precludes our jurisdiction to consider them again.  
 
 Finally, even were we to ignore the relevance of 
waiver and res judicata to this case, the majority’s remand is 
perplexing because there is simply no remedy available at 
law.  In R.J. Florig’s complaint for its federal taking claim, it 
seeks just compensation for, inter alia, their inability to 
“redevelop, sell, or lease the Florig Property . . . [for their 
inability to] expand and/or relocate the steel processing 
business for a period of more than five years . . . [and for] 
causing plaintiffs to spend thousands of hours in dealing with 
the imminent threat of condemnation.”  Complaint, p. 27.  
The problem is that such damages are not prescribed by the 
concept of just compensation under the United States 
Constitution.  In fact, the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain 
Code, under which this case was litigated, provided R.J. 
Florig with a wider range of relief than is available under 
federal law.    
 
 I agree with the majority that an actual—rather than a 
de facto—taking occurred here because title to the property 
transferred at the declaration of taking.  There can be no other 
conclusion.  This, however, has consequences for the 
parameters of the constitutional right to just compensation.  
As the Supreme Court said:   
 
This Court has often faced the 
problem of defining just 
compensation.  One principle 
from which it has not deviated is 
that just compensation “is for the 
property, and not to the owner.”  
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As a result, indirect costs to the 
property owner caused by the 
taking of his land are generally 
not part of the just compensation 
to which he is constitutionally 
entitled.   
 
United States v. Bodcaw, 440 U.S. 202, 203 (1979) (internal 
citation omitted).  In its analysis, the Bodcaw Court spoke of 
a particular federal statute that, under certain circumstances, 
authorized attorney’s fees and litigation expenses where—as 
was the case here—“a condemnation action is dismissed as 
being unauthorized . . . .”  It concluded, however, that “such  
compensation is a matter of legislative grace rather than 
constitutional command,” and it denied relief presumably 
because no such statute applied in that case.  Id. at 204.  In the 
same way, R.J. Florig does not cite to, nor can I find any 
federal statute that would authorize any remedy beyond that 
which it has already received under the Pennsylvania Eminent 
Domain Code.  Re-titling this de jure action as a de facto 
condemnation does not change this fact.  
 
 Alternatively, construing the condemnation as a 
regulatory taking does not change the analysis.  In 
circumstances that were analogous to this case, the Supreme 
Court said the following with regard to a constitutional right 
to just compensation.   
 
Even if the appellants' ability to 
sell their property was limited 
during the pendency of the 
condemnation proceeding, the 
appellants were free to sell or 
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develop their property when the 
proceedings ended. Mere 
fluctuations in value during the 
process of governmental 
decisionmaking, absent 
extraordinary delay, are “incidents 
of ownership. . . .”  
 
Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 263 n. 9 (1980) 
(overruled on other grounds in Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 
544 U.S. 528 (2005)) (quoting Danforth v. United States, 308 
U.S. 271, 285 (1939)).  R.J. Florig was never denied the 
ability to operate its business, eventually regained title to the 
property, and ultimately sold it at market value.   I see no 
basis for distinguishing R.J. Florig’s multiple claims for 
damages from “incidents of ownership.”  As a result, even 
were we to analogize this case to a regulatory taking, no relief 
is warranted. 
 
 In Williamson, the Supreme Court said:  “[B]ecause 
the Fifth Amendment proscribes takings without just 
compensation, no constitutional violation occurs until just 
compensation has been denied.”  Williamson County 
Regional Planning Com'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 
473 U.S. 172, 195 (1985).   Here, even if waiver and the 
doctrine of res judicata are ignored, R.J. Florig has not 
demonstrated any basis to claim that, by resorting to the 
remedies available under the Pennsylvania Eminent Domain 
Code, they have been unjustly compensated.  As a result, their 
claim is moot.   
 
 For all of these reasons, I dissent.  
